This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners, but it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. I provide two answers to this puzzle: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements before and after states form alliances. I examine the second argument through case studies of U.S. alliance agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Spain. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation…It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world…it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. George Washington's farewell address, 1796
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation…It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world…it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. George Washington's farewell address, 1796
At first glance, Washington's message to the fledgling government seems to be a clear statement refusing alliance politics as part of foreign policy. His strong reluctance, however, underscores the importance of alliance contracts in international politics. If alliance contracts did not have real consequences, such a warning would not be warranted. In fact, within the same passages, Washington emphasizes the sanctity of contracts and argues that the existing "engagements be observed in their genuine sense," and he also allows for "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."
In associating alliances and foreign entanglement, we must not miss that the contents of alliance contracts matter. To a certain extent, the mere formation of an alliance creates a vague and broad commitment that entangles the allies regardless of what is agreed. Conditions for activation of an alliance, however, are hardly trivial. Many alliances are not activated unless certain conditions are met, and advancements in recent literature make this point clear.
Previously, the reliability of alliances had been considered to be as low as 27% or 23%. current literature are reduced to the issue of commitment as a solution to the danger of abandonment, a concept often coupled with entrapment.
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Theorists as well as policy makers talk about the danger of entrapment, but strangely, it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. 6 My explanation is two-fold: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests.
Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and either do not form alliances when it would be a problem or demand escape clauses to minimize the problem, though only to the extent that they can afford to refrain from such alliances. Several conceptual problems have made entrapment difficult to even observe. Most problematically, alliance literature currently has at least two types of entrapment -what I call entanglement and entrapment -without establishing explicit analytical criteria for the phenomenon. I argue that the literature's use of the term "entrapment" is a mislabeling of the issue and that we need to distinguish among phenomena loosely explained by the term. The risk of entanglement (or entrapment broadly defined) is a necessary component of all military alliances, but states do not have to accept the risk of entrapment narrowly defined when entering alliances. My arguments and findings are intuitive, but they have important theoretical and policy implications on the issue of how states avoid undesirable military involvement in their allies' conflicts. By explaining how to observe entrapment analytically, this paper also illuminates the reason why entrapment is rare and yet not an illusory concept.
I will demonstrate that states carefully design alliance agreements before and after they form alliances, and that is one of the reasons why serious military entrapment is rare. 7 Alliance contracts reduce the risk of entrapment by specifying the nature of alliance obligations and conditions for their activation. This is not a new claim in the literature, but little empirical work has been done in its support. 8 Indeed, 310 of 538 alliances in the ATOP dataset have one or more conditions for activation of the alliance obligations (e.g., specific adversary, specific location, non-provocation by the ally), and this paper explains when and how allies limit their alliance obligations. 9 I argue that a state's alliance obligations are more likely to be conditional when it has more fear of entrapment or more bargaining power, and I test the argument with case studies of six alliance agreements.
The empirical section of this paper examines U.S. alliance agreements with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and Spain. These cases are ideal for my purpose, because they present variations in my explanatory variables, the fear of entrapment and intra-alliance bargaining power, and also because there are diplomatic records of the alliance negotiations, with which we can directly examine the variables rather than infer them from the circumstances. 10 The U.S.-ROK alliance is considered to be a typical case where a patron state fears entrapment by its client, 7 Leaders will refrain from forming alliances when the risk of entrapment outweighs the expected benefits. [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] of the alliance between the United States and Spain is the only one without a condition for activation. This, I argue, is due to the low level of commitments made and the low risk of entrapment for both sides. As concerns for entrapment increased, however, the bilateral agreement was revised to include clauses against entrapment.
In the sections that follow, I first explain problems with the concept of entrapment and argue that the label of entrapment should be more narrowly applied. I then argue that states design alliance agreements in such ways that they sometimes get entangled but seldom tricked into an undesirable conflict. The case studies of the United States' alliances with South Korea,
Japan, and Spain demonstrate that concerns for entrapment and shifts in bargaining power affect the designs of alliances over time. In conclusion, I discuss the theoretical and real-world implications of this paper.
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF "ENTRAPMENT"
According to Michael Mandelbaum, who first coined the term "entrapment," every member of an alliance potentially fears that "he will be entrapped in a war he does not wish to fight." 11 Glenn Snyder, who popularized the concept, defines entrapment as "being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share, or shares only partially." 12 Snyder's definition can accommodate nonmilitary entrapment, and it is argued that alliances can cause 7 political and economic entrapment as well. 13 A broad interpretation of entrapment is useful when concerns for alliance politics have effects on policies in nonmilitary fields, but, for simplicity, I
limit this paper to the discussion of military entrapment.
Unfortunately, the definitions listed above are too broad for the label of "entrapment,"
and the term is used to explain several distinct phenomena. 14 For reasons discussed below, Mandelbaum and Snyder's "entrapment" should be called entanglement, of which entrapment is a subset. We need a more precise definition of entrapment that reflects the meaning of the word and differentiates different types of (non-neutral) third-party military involvement. In place of "entrapment" in a broad sense, I propose an alternative term, entanglement. I define entanglement as the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance. Entrapment is a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement. In order for states to benefit from alliances, they have to accept some risk of entanglement, because the benefits come from the possibility of entanglement. However, states can in fact benefit from alliances without accepting the risk of entrapment (i.e. being obligated to support their allies' offensive or risky behavior that draws them into undesirable situations). Let us briefly discuss three components of the definitions. by concerns for alliance politics, the involvement is not even entanglement.
Put differently, a state is not entrapped when the expected benefit of involvement exceeds the expected cost of involvement:
(i) A state desires to get involved in its ally's war when:
Expected benefit of involvement -Expected cost of involvement > 0.
It is a desirable entanglement when the desire is attributable to benefits in alliance politics; there is no entanglement when the benefits derive from other factors. Even when the expected cost of involvement is higher than the expected benefit, a state can still choose to become entangled or entrapped, because there is a reputational cost for non-involvement.
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(ii) A state chooses to get involved in its ally's war when:
Expected benefit of involvement -Expected cost of involvement > 0 -Expected cost of non-involvement. Stronger states worry about entrapment, because they are larger suppliers of military force, but they typically also have stronger bargaining power to minimize the risk. Another reason why entrapment is inconspicuous is that real entrapment, unlike its ideal type, is likely to be partial.
States are more likely to choose to be entrapped when the cost of entrapment is not truly dire or when their interests are partially served by the involvement. Consequently, even when
entrapment happens, what we observe will be significantly different from the conventional image of entrapment in the literature.
Finally, let me briefly mention a case of non-entrapment, which might evoke the image of entrapment. World War I is a paradigmatic case of chain-ganging, a concept sometimes equated with entrapment, but no one really got entrapped into the war. 21 Chain-ganging and buck-passing are often associated with alliance ties, but they are primarily processes of balancing and non-balancing, and balancing does not require formal alliance ties. The combatants of World War I-be they expansionist or defensive-joined the war to create a balance of power favorable to them and only partially to honor their alliance commitments. A state does not get "entrapped" into a conflict when its own interest is at stake. Vietnam, 1954 Vietnam, -1968 
States and Australia in

STATES AVOID ENTRAPMENT BY CONDITIONAL ACTIVATION OF ALLIANCE OBLIGATIONS
With the conceptual problems understood, my argument is simple: the contents of alliance contracts are meant to prevent entrapment but not necessarily to prevent entanglement.
After all, alliances are supposed to entangle allies, although deterrence does not require actual entanglement. Because the benefits of an alliance derive from the possibility of entanglement, preventing all entanglement is not an option if one wants to benefit from an alliance. Therefore, states carefully design alliance contracts so that they prevent entrapment while not diminishing the value of alliances by preventing entanglement altogether.
It is an intuitive argument but still an important one. States by definition desire to avoid entrapment, but that does not tell us whether states are able to avoid it or how they avoid it. I
argue that states are usually successful in avoiding entrapment (hence, the lack of cases) and the gives answers to some contestable issues; it suggests that contents of alliance agreement are important and avoiding entrapment is possible, in fact not too difficult, and it also leads to the explanation of specific ways states avoid entrapment.
From a rationalist perspective, two factors should significantly affect the designs of alliance agreements; (i) when a state has a strong fear of entrapment, it is more likely to have conditions on its alliance obligations; (ii) when a state has a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis its When states that do not have bargaining power have entrapment concerns, we will not necessarily witness entrapment, but we should see alliance agreements that involve a significant risk of entrapment for the states with weak bargaining power. For instance, Japan had very little bargaining power when it signed a security treaty with the United States in 1951, and the treaty entailed a significant risk of entrapment for Japan. Japan desperately needed the alliance, and the occupied country was in no position to refuse the agreement. When concerns for entrapment are extremely strong, alliances will no longer be attractive to the potential victims, and their bargaining power will strengthen. In such a case, an alliance will form only if the other state is willing to make some concessions to reduce the risk of entrapment.
The principal focus of this paper is on designs of alliance agreements, but the theoretical analysis should be applicable to cases where alliances did not form because of the dangers of entrapment. For instance, the United States did not formalize its alliance with Taiwan until December 1954, even though Taiwan clearly belonged to the Western bloc in the Cold War. As
Chiang Kai-shek himself realized, "the U.S. was concerned…that the Chinese Nationalists would bring the U.S. into an effort to reconquer the mainland." 23 During the negotiation process,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made sure that the alliance was "on a basis which will not enable the Chinese Nationalists to involve" the United States "in a war with Communist
China." 24 Similarly, although Israel has close links with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the fear of entrapment makes its admission into NATO difficult.
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In the following case studies, I examine how states design alliances to avoid the risk of entrapment, and how shifts in the fear of entrapment and bargaining power affect interactions between allies over time.
CASE STUDIES
The three alliances (and six agreements) examined below have significant variations in my explanatory variables, the fear of entrapment and intra-alliance bargaining power. When a state fears entrapment, it should demand safeguard clauses against the risk, and its alliance obligations should become more conditional. Similarly, when a state has strong bargaining power, it can impose more conditions on its alliance obligations. The following case studies directly demonstrate the causal effects of the explanatory variables by tracing the changing perceptions of the decision makers documented in diplomatic records and secondary sources.
U.S.-ROK alliance
Throughout most of its history, the U.S. Thus, the United States had to fight a war because it did not want to commit to the defense of
South Korea, and it ended up committing to the country's defense, because it wanted to stop the war.
Fully aware of the danger of entrapment by Rhee, the United States imposed conditions on its alliance obligations. Article 3 of the Mutual Security Treaty reads as follows:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Because the United States had both more fear of entrapment and stronger bargaining power than South Korea, the United States naturally made its alliance obligations conditional.
Controlling aspects of alliances are often downplayed in the public discourse for political reasons, but the case shows that they are no less important than capability aggregation aspects of alliances.
In the future, if South Korea's fear of entrapment or bargaining power increases, the design of the alliance will be reconsidered.
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U.S.-Japan alliance 36
In contrast to South Korea's relationships with the United States, it was Japan that feared 35 In 2005, then-President Roh Moo-hyun said that "our citizens will not become embroiled in Northeast Asian conflicts without our consent" at the graduation ceremony of the Air Force Academy's 53rd class. military entanglement in the U.S.-Japan alliance. 37 While a stronger ally tends to fear military entrapment because it supplies military force for an alliance, the weaker fears entrapment because it has little control over its ally and still faces the consequences of the ally's actions.
American military bases and the alliance brought Japan a risk of entanglement or entrapment into the American struggle against communism. Meanwhile, the risk of entrapment for the United States was very low, because Japan was not likely to take any offensive or independent military policy, and the cost of possible entanglement was also low, because the United States, allied to Japan or not, could not afford to lose Japan to the communist bloc. 38 Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which was originally imposed by the United States, has been a powerful shield against entanglement, the pacifist constitution also increased Japanese sensitivity to the risk of entanglement. Therefore, Japanese leaders did not miss their opportunity to reduce the risk of entanglement at the revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1960.
security treaty between the United States and Japan
Deploring the inequities of the 1951 treaty, Nobusuke Kishi said that "In this way, [Japan is] like a Manchukuo." 39 Like Kishi, who led the revision of the treaty as prime minister (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) , many Japanese considered the treaty to be unequal. While the treaty granted the United
States the right to deploy its forces "in and about Japan," these forces were not committed to the defense of Japan. 40 Moreover, because there was no institutional arrangement for consultation, Japan did not have a formal procedure by which to voice its opinion on the management of the alliance, let alone to control American behavior. Thus, the treaty imposed a significant risk of entanglement on Japan but not on the United States, at least in terms of legal obligations. In practice, Japan benefited politically, economically and militarily from its alliance with the United States, and the unequal security treaty can also be considered to be a quid pro quo for the favorable peace treaty, which ended the American occupation of Japan. 41 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the text of the treaty was unfavorable to Japan. In addition to the lack of defense commitment, the treaty permitted Americans to intervene in domestic disturbances of Japan, prohibited Japan from granting military and base-related rights to any third power without the prior consent of the United States, and did not allow either party to terminate the alliance.
Japan's initial efforts to revise the treaty were unsuccessful, reflecting the country's weak international standing at the time. minimized the risk of entanglement by successfully restricting the commitment to its own territory and by excluding even the Ryukyu (Okinawa) and Bonin (Ogasawara) islands, which were administered by the United States at the time. 50 The Japanese also succeeded in emphasizing the restrictions imposed on their military policy by its "constitutional provisions and processes." Second, in exchanged notes on the implementation of the 1960 treaty, the Japanese imposed an obligation of prior consultation on the introduction of U.S. nuclear forces and on the use of U.S. bases in Japan for military combat operations other than those conducted under Article 5. Although there are loopholes and secret provisions that cast doubt on the effectiveness of the prior consultation, 51 the Japanese did put a limit on the use of U.S. facilities in Japan. 52 Third, Article 10 stipulated that "after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given." Although it was highly unlikely that either party would use this provision, it still gave each a legal exit from the alliance, which would limit the risk of entanglement. The Japanese probably requested the limit of duration to give the treaty an appearance of equality, but the Spanish case suggests that an alliance partner could gain considerable leverage from such a limit on the duration of an alliance.
I do not delve into domestic politics of the treaty revision, but there is a strong irony about Kishi's leadership in this episode. 53 The case of the U.S.-Japan alliance clearly demonstrates that a weaker ally can fear entrapment and that bargaining power plays an important role in designs of alliance agreements.
Japan feared entrapment but was able to insert safeguard clauses in the alliance treaty only after its bargaining position improved. As noted above, Japan tried to avoid not only entrapment but entanglement in a very broad sense. The pacifism of postwar Japan partially explains the policy, but Japan could afford to take such a policy, because it had little fear of abandonment. When Japan felt less indispensable to the United States, for example, after the Sino-U.S. rapprochement or the end of the Cold War, Japan increased its commitment to the alliance and became more willing to accept the risk of entanglement.
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U.S.-Spain alliance
The U.S.-Spain alliance, especially in its early period, was relaxed about the risk of entrapment or entanglement. This was natural, because the alliance presented a very small risk of entrapment or entanglement to its members. 55 Strategically, the two countries faced no major military threat around Spain, and neither did they have revisionist goals that could entrap the 54 The two governments approved the first Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978, and Japan began sending its troops abroad in the 1990s. 55 Entanglement was unlikely, and if it happened in the context of East-West confrontation, it would not have been costly, because the two countries would not have been able to avoid fighting regardless of the alliance.
other side. 56 The frontline of the European Cold War was far away, and neither party desperately needed the other's help for countering external military threats. Franco sought economic and political goals in the military arrangement with the United States, and "the value of the Spanish bases" to the United States was, according to a classic study on the subject, "prospective and relative rather than immediate and absolute." 57 Consequently, the alliance committed the two states very little in terms of military obligations-too little to entangle them into military conflicts. This, I argue, is the reason why the first period of the U.S.-Spain alliance is the only American alliance agreement that has no condition in the ATOP dataset.
In fact, the low level of commitment makes the status of the military arrangement somewhat ambiguous. We can find the origin of the alliance in the Pact of Madrid, which was signed in 1953 as a quid pro quo arrangement that provided aid to Spain for U.S. bases there.
Arthur Preston Whitaker observed that the pact did "not constitute a full-fledged military alliance" but rather "a quasi-alliance." 58 The ATOP dataset codes the bilateral relationship as a military alliance from 1963, when the base agreement was extended and the two sides jointly declared that a "threat to either country, and to the joint facilities that each provides for the common defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes." Although the Spanish tried to present the series of base agreements as full partnerships, they knew the reality and continued to seek a more formalized alliance. 59 Until the third period of the alliance (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) , the United States never gave Spain a security 56 Threats to Spanish colonies in North Africa intensified later but were nothing comparable to those faced by American allies elsewhere. With respect to the risk from irredentism, Franco would not try to regain Gibraltar by force, unlike Syngman Rhee or Chiang Kai-shek. Understandably, many Spaniards voiced their concern about the risk of entrapment, but it is not clear how serious Spanish leaders perceived the risk to be, because Spanish negotiators usually mentioned the risk of entrapment as a tactic to raise the price on the bases.
Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain
The negotiations for the 1970 agreement revolved around such topics as Spanish entry into NATO, an American security guarantee, and the amount of aid to Spain, but for the present purpose, I will focus on the limit imposed on American use of the bases in Spain. The U.S.-Spain alliance began without conditions on alliance obligations, because neither party feared entrapment. The allies added safeguard clauses to the alliance agreement as they discovered potential situations for entrapment and as they increased commitment to each other.
Even though the risk of entrapment was a relatively minor issue in the alliance, both the stronger and the weaker ally still made efforts to reduce the risk. The case also illustrates that the risk of entrapment is part of the overall alliance management and that states balance the fear of entrapment with other concerns. Spain balanced the fear of entrapment not only with the fear of abandonment but also with the military and economic aid from the United States. Table 1 
Beyond My Cases
Readers might wonder how generalizable my argument is, given that all my cases are U.S.
alliances formed during the Cold War. In addition to the uniqueness of the period, the vast capability of the United States and its legalistic foreign policy might make my cases appear to be outliers. A separate paper is necessary to address the issue of generalizability, but my analysis of the ATOP dataset suggests a wide applicability of this paper's argument. For instance, with simple descriptive statistics, we can see that conditions of alliance agreements vary according to the type of alliance obligations, a major factor that affects the risk of entrapment (see Table 2 ). 78 Because members of an alliance can have different obligations and conditions, it is better to use member-level data than alliance-level data. The second row shows the percentage of each obligation being conditional in any aspect. A consultation obligation can also be conditional upon an ally requesting consultation. 79 In the ATOP dataset, an alliance can contain more than one type of obligations.
fairly conditional. For instance, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 contained a neutrality clause conditional on being attacked by a third party. Having explained how to observe entrapment analytically, which has never been done in alliance literature before, this paper empirically demonstrates that states do fear entrapment.
Rarity of entrapment does not mean that states do not fear it, and entrapment rarely happens exactly because of the fear and states' efforts to cope with it. The case studies show that states pay attention to details of alliance agreements, and it may well be that these details had significant impact on many states' decisions about military entanglement.
One may wonder, then, why states do not always safeguard against every undesirable contingency in alliance agreements. Unexpected things happen, but even predictable contingencies are often not mentioned in alliance contracts. As James Morrow points out, leaving some ambiguity gives allies a benefit in deterrence and discourages them from taking advantage of explicit commitments. 81 We need to keep in mind, however, that the distribution of the benefit among allies is not equal, and states bargain hard for a better position within their alliances. States with less fear of abandonment can negotiate hard, while states with more fear of abandonment have to make demands carefully. Because states need to balance the risk of entrapment with the risk of abandonment, they sometimes have to accept the risk of entrapment. 82 As in the case of Franco's Spain, it is also conceivable that states accept some risk of entrapment for side payments made by their allies.
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Like deterrence, the effect of the safeguard clauses against entrapment is hard to observe, because what we observe is a non-event, but there are several reasons to believe that they are quite effective. If safeguard clauses had no real effects, states would not exert so much effort in designing and negotiating their contents. If the conditions on alliance obligations did not matter, 81 Morrow, "Why Write Them Down?": 73. 82 Snyder, "Dilemma in Alliance" and Alliance Politics. 83 This is a situation different from voluntary military involvement for side payments, because the states are accepting only the possibility of entrapment in the future and do not desire the military involvement.
there should not be such a significant difference between the early and more recent findings on alliance reliability. 84 Furthermore, when safeguard clauses apply and a state still chooses to get involved (i.e. when a state involves itself in a conflict of its ally without being obligated to do so),
there is a good chance that the state has a motivation not related to the alliance-and thus the state is not really entrapped or entangled.
I conclude with two related policy implications. First, as long as their contents are carefully designed, military alliances do not have to entail a high risk of entrapment. George
Washington considered unwise the extension of alliances without shared interests, but the origin of the U.S.-ROK alliance suggests that it can be equally unwise to refrain from an alliance when shared interests are at stake. Since states can adjust the risk of entrapment through the designs of alliances, and since alliances give states some control on their allies' policy, extending alliance commitments may actually make the states less likely to get involved in military conflicts, even without the deterrence effects of military alliances. Given that states also engage in military conflicts against their allies less and less-an effect of alliances that has proven surprisingly weak in the past 85 -military alliances have a potential of becoming strong institutions of international security management.
Second, and finally, the distribution of capabilities in the current international system 84 See the introduction of this paper. 85 When we examine how alliances end, approximately 10.1% (52/513) of alliance membership terminations under multipolarity is attributable to intra-alliance war, whereas only 3.5% ( may be a blessing to the United States but a curse to others. 86 Fear of entrapment is not a good rationale for a more restrained U.S. grand strategy, because, under unipolarity, the United States not only has advantages over potential and actual adversaries but also over potential and actual allies. With its bargaining advantages, the United States may well benefit from modifying the contents of its alliance commitments, but withdrawing from alliance commitments altogether would be a misguided policy, because these commitments alone are not likely to drag the United
States into a costly war. Additionally, these commitments enhance U.S. influence on the allies and deterrence against potential enemies. Meanwhile, the United States has more power to entrap its allies, and other states have more reasons to accept entrapment in order to avoid abandonment by the sole super-ally. It remains to be seen how American leaders can use their advantage in constructive ways and how leaders of other countries will come up with acceptable solutions to their problems.
